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Abstract: This paper questions the received genealogy of proportionality, which traces its origins to continental 
European sources, especially German administrative law. The paper goes back to Plato and Cicero, two 
defining writers on law and politics in the classical world. Analysis of their work reveals a richer role for 
proportionality in visions of public law, and how deeply that idea is embedded in classical conceptions of 
justice. We see in Plato and Cicero two dimensions particularly worth noting. Proportionality is ‘rounded off’ in 
relation to an overarching scale of values – it has a metaphysical or celestial quality. Proportionality also 
‘reaches out’ to identify the relevant political community to which proportionate justice is to apply – which, in 
Cicero, has a universal or universalising tendency. Returning to the present, the paper argues that the 
proportionality principle, while certainly attenuated when set against its classical forebears, shares some of the 
same features. In particular, modern conceptions of proportionality involve, whether explicitly or not, the 
phenomena of 'rounding off' and 'reaching out’, a point that is illustrated by referring to two different attempts 
to make sense of proportionality in common law judging. One, like Plato, turns inward to the (perceived) 
structure and values of the state. The other, following Cicero, turns outward in a search for more global 
standards of justice. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a story we tell ourselves about the development of the proportionality principle. It goes 
something like this. The doctrine of proportionality is of continental European origin. Born in 
Prussia in the late 18th century as the law was being codified along Rechtsstaat lines, and refined 
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by German administrative courts in the 19th century,1 the principle really took off after the 
Second World War. Not only did the administrative law principle take constitutional form at that 
time in Germany,2 it was also taken up, in imitation of the German model, as a ‘meta-principle of 
judicial governance’ by a number of other states and by various international regimes, most 
notably the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Community, and the World 
Trade Organization.3 In English law, the impetus behind the adoption of the proportionality test 
came directly from European sources, predominantly the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).4 Elsewhere in the common law 
world, the importation of the principle from continental European sources is less direct but just 
as clear. In New Zealand’s case, for instance, the principle was imported from Canada.5 But the 
Canadians themselves lifted the principle from the ECtHR.6For common lawyers, a recital of 
this origins story often acts as a prelude to handwringing over the imposition of an ‘alien’ graft 
from ‘highly systematic’ Continental traditions of public law onto an otherwise organic system of 
common law.7 
In this paper, I set out to explore the conventional wisdom of proportionality, which if not 
strictly speaking incorrect is at best a very partial truth.8I turn first to Plato and then to Cicero, 
two defining writers on law and politics in the classical world, in order to uncover an older 
ancestry for proportionality than is generally recognised. Analysis of these writers reveals a richer 
role for proportionality in visions of public law, and how deeply that idea is embedded in 
classical conceptions of justice. As I go on to explain, proportionality seems to require both a 
‘rounding off’ in relation to an overarching scale of values, typically cast as fundamental and 
metaphysical, and at the same time a ‘reaching out’ to identify the relevant political community 
to which proportionate justice is to apply. Proportionality on the classical account, we shall see, 
has a tendency to strive towards both the celestial and the universal. Returning to the present, I 
argue that the proportionality principle applied by courts and discussed by commentators, while 
                                                     
1 Article 10(2) of the Prussian General Law (Allgemeines Landrecht) of 1794 authorised the government to exercise police 
powers in order to ensure public peace, but limited those powers to such measures as were necessary to achieve the chosen 
goal: ‘The police is to take the necessary measures for the maintenance of public peace, security and order.’ See M. Cohen-
Eliya and I. Porat, ‘American Balancing and German Proportionality: The Historical Origins’ (2010) 8 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 263, 271-273. 
2 S. Baer, ‘Equality: The Jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court’ (1999) 5 Columbia Journal of European Law 249, 
261-264.  
3 A. Stone Sweet and M. Jud, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 73, 112. 
4 See eg De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands & Housing [1999] 1 AC 69 (PC); R (Daly) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532. 
5 See for example Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA), 283, per Richardson J; Moonen v Film & Literature 
Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA). 
6 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 (SCC). See also eg D. Grimm, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional 
Jurisprudence’ (2007) 57 U Toronto LJ 383. 
7 See eg M. Taggart, ‘Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury’ (2008) New Zealand Law Review 423, 438 fn 81: ‘The German 
word for motorway is inserted in brackets because of the strong German influence on the continental European evolution 
of proportionality and Lord Diplock’s attraction to the highly systematic European systems of administrative law.’ See also 
eg S. Boyron, ‘Proportionality in English Administrative Law: A Faulty Translation?’ (1992) 12 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
237. 
8 The paper only discusses public law. For a history of the concept of proportionality that focuses on penal law from 
Beccaria and Bentham, see A. Ristroph, ‘Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government’ (2005) 55 Duke Law Journal 
263.  
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certainly attenuated when set against its classical forebears, shares some of the same features. In 
particular, modern conceptions of proportionality involve, whether explicitly nor not, the 
phenomena of ‘rounding off’ and ‘reaching out’, a point that I demonstrate by referring to two 
different attempts to make sense of proportionality in common law judging. One, like Plato, 
turns inward to the (perceived) structure and values of the state. The other, following Cicero, 
turns outward in a search for more global standards of justice.   
 
 
 
PLATO, THE SOUL, AND COSMIC ORDER 
 
For Plato, the goal of human existence was ‘becoming like god (homoiosis theoi) so far as is 
possible’.9 It is god, he said, ‘who, par excellence, is the measure of all things for us, rather than a 
man, as some people claim.’10 He is taking issue here with the relativism of the sophists, and 
their claim that ‘man is the measure of all things’ (Protagoras). What, then, does it take to 
‘become like god’? Whereas ‘holiness’ does not appear in the list of cardinal virtues that appears 
in the Republic, it does appear in the later Theaetetus, where Plato says that to become like god is to 
become ‘just and holy, together with wisdom’. Holiness is the virtue that concerns service to 
god. Since god is essentially good, to serve god is the same thing as to lead a good life.11 
The relationship between god (the universe or world-soul) and our selves (our soul) is most 
fully developed in Timaeus, another late dialogue. Here, Plato pursues an analogy between the 
‘world-soul’ and our own soul – the universe supplies, then, the ‘larger text’ for deciphering the 
nature of the human soul. The Timaeus offers a ‘likely account’ of – or metaphor for – the origins 
of the universe. A demiurge or ‘craftsman god’, finding ‘everything visible in a state of turmoil, 
moving in a discordant and chaotic manner […] led it from chaos to order, which he regarded as 
in all was better.’12 In so doing, and wanting ‘everything to be good, marred by as little 
imperfection as possible’, he took an eternal and unchanging model (form) as his paradigm.13 
Note the type of order that has now come into being. There is one universe, not many; ‘a single, 
unique universe, capable, thanks to its perfection, of keeping its own company’.14 It is a ‘perfectly 
spherical’ universe in which the pre-existing admixture of basic elements (fire, air, earth, water) is 
now blended in perfect proportion. The previously spasmodic, imbalanced movements of chaos 
are replaced by ordered motion: ‘so he gave it circular movement, by starting it spinning at a 
constant pace in the same place and within itself.’15 Since what ‘is perfectly good can accomplish 
only what is perfectly beautiful’, and given that intelligent products are more beautiful than those 
lacking intelligence, the universe has intelligence and thus soul, being constructed ‘by endowing 
                                                     
9 Plato, Theaetetus (in R. Waterfield (ed), London: Penguin, 2004), 176b. 
10 Plato, Laws (in T.R. Saunders (ed), London: Penguin, 2004), 716c.  
11 D. Sedley, ‘The Ideal of Godlikeness’ in G. Fine (ed), Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 
313-314. 
12 Plato, Timaeu (in R. Waterfield (ed), Oxford: OUP, 2008), 30a. 
13 ibid., 29b. 
14 ibid., 34b. 
15 ibid., 34a. 
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soul with intelligence and body with soul’.16 The world-soul, Plato tells us, is interwoven with the 
whole body of the universe and characterised ‘by reasoning and harmony’. ‘The soul was 
blended together out of identity, difference and sameness (its three ingredients); the principle of 
its partition and bonding was rational proportionality; and it circles back on itself.’17 The reason 
and harmony of the universe is arranged geometrically and consists in (or is expressed by) sets of 
mathematical ratios.18 These ratios also equate to the harmonic structure of Greek music.19 The 
world-soul is at the same time a kind of musical instrument.20 Cosmic order is ordered (and 
harmonious) beauty. Reason ‘is the supreme power among the heavenly bodies.’21 
The story of the birth of the universe (and the world-soul) is also the story of the birth of 
our own soul. The soul was fashioned from what was left of the ingredients the demiurge had 
used for the world-soul. Charged with finishing the job, the younger gods bound the divine 
aspect of the soul into the head, made spherical in imitation of the shape of the universe.22 The 
soul thus dwells ‘in the summit of our body, and it rises us up from the earth towards the 
heavenly region to which we are naturally akin, since we are not soil-bound plants but, properly 
speaking, creatures rooted in heaven. For it is from heaven, where our souls originally came into 
existence, that the gods suspended our heads, which are roots, and set our bodies upright.’23 The 
body, by contrast, is a creature of necessity, handed over to the head as its servant. Man contains 
two kinds of (or parts to the) soul. A mortal soul, found within the chest, subject to necessity 
and the appetitive desires, ‘those mindless advisers confidence and fear, and obdurate passion, 
and gullible hope’, and as such ‘liable to terrible, but inevitable, experiences’.24 And a divine soul, 
housed within the head, fashioned by the gods with the goal of quelling the uneasy revolutions 
that occur within us through the application of divinely ordered (or inspired) intelligence. The 
gods gave us eyes to see the firmament and the intelligence to observe the rational revolutions of 
the heavens. The purpose of so doing was to enable us to calculate those circular motions 
correctly and to assimilate our own to the perfect evenness of the god’s, and so stabilize the 
                                                     
16 ibid., 30b. Also 53b: ‘the first thing the god did, when he came to organize the universe, was use shapes and numbers to 
assign them definite forms; and we can take for granted, as the principal axiom affirmed by us, that the god did not leave 
them in the condition he found them, but made them as beautiful and as perfect as they could possibly be.’ See also Plato, 
Sophist (in N.P. White (ed), Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993). 
17 Plato, n 12 above, 37a. See also T.M. Olshewsky, ‘On the Relations of Soul to Body in Plato and Aristotle’ (1979) Journal 
of the History of Philosophy 391, 395: ‘The mixing of intermediate existence, sameness and difference is described in terms of 
complicated due proportionality which involves not only number but magnitude.’ 
18 Including the so-called Golden ratio or Golden mean, hugely influential among Renaissance artists and architects. ‘The 
best bond is the one that most effectively unifies itself and the things it is joining, and nothing does this better than 
correspondence. For whenever among three numbers (or, for that matter, three solids or three powers) one is a mean, such 
that as the first number in the series stands to the mean, so the mean stands to the final number of the series (or, 
conversely, as the final number stands to the mean, so the mean stands to the first), then the mean can also be treated as 
first or last (or, alternatively, the first and last terms can be treated as means), and so all of them will of necessity turn out to 
be identical; and since they are all identical, they are all one.’ See Timaeus, 31c-32a.  
19 There is no mention in Timaeus and subsequent works of any audible harmony of the heavenly bodies. There is harmony 
in the structure of the world-soul, but no sound. This differs from the Pythagoreans and also from the Myth of Er at 617b-
c of Plato, Republic (in G.R.F. Ferrari (ed), T. Griffith (trans), Cambridge: CUP, 2000).   
20 G. Klosko, The Development of Plato’s Political Theory (Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed, 2006), 223: ‘Plato attributes great importance 
to musical forms’.  
21 Plato, n 10 above, 967e.  
22 Plato, n 12 above, 44d. 
23 ibid, 90a. 
24 ibid, 69d. 
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wandering revolutions within us.25 ‘We should correct the corrupted revolutions in our head 
concerned with becoming, by learning the harmonies and revolutions of the whole world.’26 This 
process of ratiocination is, for Plato, more a matter of mathematical calculation than empirical 
observation: ‘it is the eternal mathematical principles of the cyclical celestial motions that we are 
advised to internalize in our own cerebral revolutions.’27 
 
 
 
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CITY 
 
The origins of the universe, and also of our soul, thus represent the triumph of reason over 
necessity. The persuasive power of intelligence ordered things in such a way that they were 
geared naturally to strive towards perfection. But what has all this got to do with politics, the 
city, and its laws? A natural place to start is to slide from the Timaeus to its companion dialogue, 
the unfinished Critias.28 At the centre of that work, in effect a kind of political allegory, lies the 
recounting of a legend of the interaction between two ancient cities: one, (Old) Athens, 
embodies the excellence of equilibrium and lasting unity; the other, Atlantis, embodies the 
corruption that goes with unbalanced (imperial) growth. ‘The catastrophe of Atlantis, predictable 
ever since the description of the island, will be the physiological result of the pronounced 
imbalance of its constitution.’29 For Plato, the city was a political living being. It is a particular 
place; it is also a particular population and a particular constitution; and a particular geographical 
setting. Hence the wealth of details – geographical, botanical, architectural, and zoological – of 
the account in Critias. 
The city, like the men who inhabit it, has intelligence, a soul. But the connection goes 
deeper. For there is an isomorphism at work in Plato’s treatment of the just state and soul. ‘So 
the just man will not differ at all from the just city, so far as the character of justice is concerned, 
but will be like it.’30The ‘individual and the city are identical objects, which differ only in scale 
and upon which the same letters are inscribed, those of the term “justice”’.31 Justice in respect of 
the individual is the same as justice in respect of the city. For both, the end to which reason 
guides them is a harmonious internal order. The excellence (or otherwise) of the city becomes 
inseparable from the excellence of the thought that lies behind it. And, especially in the later 
dialogues, Plato assimilates the political constraints attendant upon the ordering of human affairs 
to the cosmological constraints attendant upon the ordering of physical objects.  
                                                     
25 ibid, 47c. A sentiment echoed by Kant in his Critique of Practical Reason (1788, in M. Gregor (ed), Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1997), 133: ‘Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more 
often and more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heaven above me and the moral law within me. I do not need to search for 
them and merely conjecture them as though they were veiled in obscurity or in the transcendent region beyond my horizon. 
I see them clearly before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence.’ 
26 Plato, n 12 above, 90d. 
27 Sedley, n 11 above, 323. 
28 These two dialogues were designed to form the first two parts of a trilogy – Timaeus-Critias-Hermocrates. 
29 J.F. Pradeau, Plato and the City (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2002), 129.  
30 Plato, n 19 above, 435b. See also ibid, 434e: ‘perhaps by looking at the two [city and man] side by side and rubbing them 
together, we may make justice blaze out, like fire from two sticks’. 
31 Pradeau, n 29 above, 44. See further B. Williams, ‘The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato’s Republic’ in Fine, n 11 above.  
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The connection between soul, city, and cosmos is most visible in Plato’s final work, the 
Laws. Some find it ‘an old man’s work’, driven by disillusionment and pessimism about the 
possibility of realising ideals in politics.32 Others see in Plato’s articulation of his ‘second-best’ 
state,33 built on top of a vast accumulation of empirical knowledge of comparative law, evidence 
of ‘a more intimate understanding of the materials the statesman has to use, a more persistent 
effort to work out in its details the political ideal’.34 Plato’s philosophical method for 
constructing his near-ideal city in the Laws mirrors his metaphor of the creation of the ordered 
universe by the demiurge in the Timaeus. In the process of creating the cosmos, the demiurge 
makes the best it can of things (elements) that happens to be at hand in Chaos. The Lawgiver (or 
political philosopher) must be like the demiurge in politics, fashioning the laws of the city by 
sifting through the laws and constitutions of various existing city-states to identify what works 
best. As in the Republic and the Statesman, the achievement of unity within the city remains the 
ultimate purpose of politics (while recognising that perfect unity can never be achieved on earth). 
Whereas written law is absent from the ideal city imagined in the Republic, and the Statesman 
required the law to preserve the city only in the absence of a knowledgeable governor,35 the Laws 
expects it to construct the city and to bring about its unity. The law has instrumental and 
constitutive functions: it ‘is the proper means used by the legislator to found the city and set it in 
order’.36 Law (nomos) is the instrument of the intellect (nous). It is the ‘distribution of reason’37 – 
in the sense that through it, reason determines modes of conduct, and also in the sense that 
reason effects a distribution (a sharing out of what is due to each individual in the city).38 
The Laws is prescriptive to the point of obsession about what reason prescribes for the 
constitution of the city. The city (named Magnesia) described in the Laws is small, rural, and set 
slightly inland in an averagely fertile place (on Crete) with no immediate neighbours. The city, 
regarded from the start as a living entity, can thus be virtuous. The territory of the state is 
divided into 5,040 equal plots of land, each of which is farmed by one family. Citizens are 
grouped into four classes depending on how wealthy they are. But strict limits are placed on 
wealth: the richest will never own more than four times the value of one plot of land.39 Citizens 
are also prohibited from owning gold or silver.  
The political life of the city takes place in three main bodies: a citizens’ assembly; a council 
elected by all the classes; and (most intriguingly) the ‘nocturnal council’ (nukterinos sullogos).40 So 
                                                     
32 Klosko, n 20 above, 217. The mood of disappointment and dispiritedness to be found in the Laws may owe something to 
the failure of Dion’s adventures in Syracuse, in which Plato was involved. But this explanation has also been doubted. 
Morrow points out, for instance, that the disillusionment predated his experiences in Syracuse. ‘Of all the dialogues, the 
Gorgias, a relatively early one, expresses the deepest pessimism about politics.’ G. Morrow, ‘The Demiurge in Politics: The 
Timaeus and the Laws’ (1953-1964) 27 Proceedings and Address of the American Philosophical Association 5, 7.  
33 Plato, n 10 above, 739a-b: ‘[T]he right procedure is to describe not only the ideal society but the second and third best 
too, and then leave it to anyone in charge of founding a community to make a choice between them. So let’s follow that 
procedure now: let’s describe the absolutely ideal society, then the second-best, then the third.’ 
34 Morrow, n 32 above, 7.  
35 Plato, Statesman (in J. Annas and R. Waterfield (eds), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995), 297b. 
36 Pradeau, n 29 above, 142. 
37 Plato, n 10 above, 714a2.  
38 Pradeau, n 29 above, 142.  
39 Plato, n 10 above, 744a-745a. 
40 In the original text, the nocturnal council is explicitly mentioned only twice. Its name does not carry a formal connotation 
in the Greek. ‘The very name of the body’, V. Bradley Lewis argues, ‘suggests and informal body unlike the usual political 
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called because it meets before dawn in order to prepare proceedings for the day to come, this 
last body is composed of the ten most senior nomophulakes or ‘guardians of the law’, the Minister 
of Education and his living predecessors, and priests who have won high distinction. Each of 
these is to bring with him a younger man of between the ages of 30 and 40.41 The Laws is brief in 
its account of the nocturnal council and its tasks – indeed the body only appears very late in the 
text. Plato does say, however, that its discussion must centre on the city, the problems of 
legislation, and anything pertinent learned from other cities. Members ‘must be particularly 
concerned with those studies that promise, if pursued, to further their researches by throwing 
light on otherwise obscure legislative problems.42 
The nocturnal council has few formal powers. And yet the Athenian Stranger (Plato’s 
protagonist here) refers to it as the ‘anchor’ of the whole city, a ‘safeguard of the laws’ which 
‘would keep safe everything we wanted it to’.43 How this can occur has been a subject of much 
scholarly debate.44 But it seems likely that Plato envisaged that the council might exercise an 
informal steering and educative role on the other officers of state and, through them, the people. 
Its influence is to be found ‘in the interstices and looser joints of the legal structure, not 
contradicting but supplementing the rule of law’.45 This indirect but pervasive moral influence 
stems partly from the council’s composition – the men who sit on it hold, after all, many of the 
city’s most senior offices. It also arises from the nature of the council’s task. Plato sees that the 
city he describes requires at least some of its officials to exercise the philosophical and juristic 
intelligence needed to preserve, expound, and apply the principles on which the laws are based.46 
The nocturnal council provides the central forum for just this process of reflection. As such, it 
makes possible just the kind of injection of philosophy into a system of rule that Plato 
consistently advocated.47 ‘Where the Republic presents the philosophic regime, the Laws presents 
a regime with philosophy’.48 It is in this way that the nocturnal council represents something akin 
to the city’s (divine) soul. It must, says the Athenian Stranger, ‘possess virtue in all its 
completeness’.49 The body, Plato says, ‘is to constitute the Intelligence, or Nous, of the state’;50 
and it exists to make the life of the city subject to the intellect.  
The politics and sociology of the city are reflected in its topography. Designed according to 
a geometric pattern, the city is laid out in a series of concentric circles and sections through 
which the citizens rotate, from their dwelling in one of the twelve designated urban areas to their 
                                                                                                                                                              
institutions of the city. A more accurate, albeit homely, English translation would render nukterinos sullogos as something like 
“nightly conference” or “nightly meeting”.’ V.B. Lewis, ‘The Nocturnal Council and Platonic Political Philosophy’ (1998) 
19 History of Political Thought 1, 15.  
41 Plato, n 10 above, 951e.  
42 ibid, 951e-952a.  
43 ibid, 960d & 961c.  
44 See eg G. Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City: A Historical Interpretation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); G. Klosko, 
‘The Nocturnal Council in Plato’s Laws’ (1988) 36 Political Studies 74; X. Marquez, ‘Knowledge and Law in Plato’s Statesman 
and Laws: A Response to Klosko’ (2010) Political Studies 1. 
45 Morrow, n 32 above, 19.  
46 Morrow, n 44 above, 23.  
47 For instance, Plato argues in his Seventh Epistle that the only solution to the problem of civil strife (stasis) is the injection 
of philosophy into the regime. 
48 Lewis, n 40 above, 16. Plato, n 19 above, 473d: ‘Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have 
the spirit and power of philosophy, cities will never have rest from their evils.’ 
49 Plato, n 10 above, 962d3.  
50 Morrow, n 32 above, 17.  
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dwelling in one of the twelve rural ones, according to a precise calendar set out in legislation. 
The movement of the citizenry is designed to have a pragmatic (educative) function, in that it is 
designed to get citizens to take an interest in the entire city territory. But it also consciously 
mimics the movement of the heavenly bodies, as described in the Timaeus. ‘For the craftsmen 
who fashion the city, the model is the god who fashioned the world: political demiurgy imitates 
the cosmological demiurgy and their products are similar. In its own way, the circular city of the 
Laws is an image of the world’s sphere.’51 The Laws presents the image of the city as a living 
entity endowed with both soul and body. It is the law’s task to achieve peace in the city and 
harmony in the soul of its citizens. The justice of the city is the same as justice for its citizens, 
and justice in both cases is patterned on the eternal law of the heavens. Indeed, Plato in the Laws 
plays on the homonymy of nomos = law, and nomos = chant. The harmonious city is to reflect the 
unchanging harmony of the spheres.  
Proportionality is a pivotal concept within this vision of the city. Justice, for Plato, is 
ultimately a question of proportional equality. Justice is defined by Socrates in the Republic as a 
matter of ‘rendering to each that which is fitting [for him]’.52 In the Laws, Plato describes two 
concepts of equality: The first sort – arithmetic equality – equates to the simple distribution of 
equal awards (by lot). But it is the second type, proportionate equality, that he considers ‘genuine 
equality’. He defines it in this way: 
 
The general method I mean is to grant much to the great and less to the less great, adjusting 
what you give to take account of the real nature of each – specifically, to confer high 
recognition on great virtue, but when you come to the poorly educated in this respect, to 
treat them as they deserve. We maintain, in fact, that statesmanship too consists of 
essentially this – strict justice.53 
 
Justice, understood as proportionate equality, has distributive as well as corrective dimensions. 
This is clear from the division of plots and limits on wealth in the Laws. But it also applies to 
Plato’s ideal distribution of authority and social position within the city, which is done in 
accordance with the natural capacity or fitness of individuals. Justice in the city relates to virtue 
of the soul. The ‘inquiry into justice as a personal virtue or condition of the soul [is] the internal 
correlate of justice as right external relations in a community’.54 Maintaining justice within the 
city is at least in part about educating citizens in a way that will enable them to maintain the right 
inner equilibrium to act as good citizens. The Lawgiver’s task (in the Laws) is to provide an 
adequate balance of pleasure and pain by habituating citizens in the right way. Maintaining inner 
equilibrium involves not just the triumph of reason over the appetitive desires of the body (those 
‘mindless advisers’), but more specifically that the various parts of body and soul are kept in 
proportion to each other. What is true of the human soul is also true of the city. Harmony and 
unity will be produced only if the city is structured in such a way as to keep various classes of 
people in the right balance. Harmony also requires the maintenance of the right (circular) sort of 
                                                     
51 Pradeau, n 29 above, 159.  
52 Plato, n 10 above, 332c. 
53 ibid, 757b-c. 
54 F.G. Whelan, ‘Justice: Classical and Christian’ (1982) 10 Political Theory 435, 441.  
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motion – the movements of thoughts within the head, the movement of the citizens, the 
movements of the heavenly bodies. Harmony has a cosmic – and therefore mathematical – 
specification. Proportion or ‘right measure’ (taken literally in the late dialogues) in the city can in 
principle be identified precisely by mathematical (and musical) reflection on the model of the 
cosmos. 
Proportionality flows through all aspects of Plato’s theory. Proportion inheres in the soul 
and in the city and in the universe.55 Proportionality is built into the very structure of the cosmos 
– and by extension of the city and the soul. It is the property or relation which gives order, 
beauty, and goodness to each. Proportionality, then, is a theological concept.56 We might also 
observe, from our vantage point, the inegalitarian – even totalitarian57 – burden that 
proportionality shoulders in Plato’s theory. For proportionate goodness insists, or so the 
Athenian Stranger tells us, on ‘graded property-classes, to ensure that offices and taxes and 
grants must be arranged on the basis of what a man is worth. It’s not only his personal virtues or 
his ancestors’ that should be considered, or his physical strength and good looks: what he’s made 
of his wealth or poverty should also be taken into account. In short, the citizens must be 
esteemed and given office, so far as possible, on exactly equal terms of proportionate 
inequality’.58 
 
 
 
CICERO, THE REPUBLIC, AND IMPERIAL JUSTICE 
 
Marcus Tullius Cicero was a lawyer, politician, and statesman active in the last decades of the 
Roman Republic. ‘Saviour of the Republic’ when, as consul, he put down the Catiline conspiracy 
in 63BC,59 Cicero went on to write a series of political and philosophical works during the period 
from 60BC, when he was excluded from active politics with the rise of the first triumvirate. 
Espousing a version of ‘humane conservatism’,60 Cicero defends in those works the institutions 
and traditions of the Roman Republic, understood by him as a ‘mixed’ and ultimately timocratic 
constitution.  
                                                     
55 Note that this vision of the unity of the virtues is not confined to Plato. See A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (London: 
Duckworth, 2nd ed, 1985), 142: ‘The ancestor of one of these sets of answers is Plato, for whom as we have seen the 
virtues are not merely compatible with each other, but the presence of each requires the presence of all. This strong thesis 
concerning the unity of the virtues is reiterated both by Aristotle and Aquinas, even though they differ from Plato – and 
from each other – in a number of important ways. The presupposition which all three share is that there exists a cosmic 
order which dictates the place of each virtue in a total harmonious scheme of moral life. Truth in the moral sphere consists 
in the conformity of moral judgment to the order of this scheme.’ 
56 Plato, n 10 above, 966c: ‘[W]e must never choose as a Guardian of the Laws anyone who is not preternaturally gifted or 
has not worked hard at theology.’ 
57 See C.C.W. Taylor, ‘Plato’s Totalitarianism’ in Fine, n 11 above.  
58 Plato, n 10 above, 744b. 
59 In the course of putting down the conspiracy Cicero was instrumental in arranging the extra-legal execution of one of the 
chief conspirators, Publius Cornelius Lentulus, praetor and former consul. Such action caused resentment in some quarters, 
and Cicero was sent into exile by the tribune Publius Clodius Pulcher in 58. (Pompey secured his recall in the next year.) 
60 A. Everitt, Cicero (London: John Murray, 2001), 176.  
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The influence of Plato – and also the Stoics – in Cicero’s political philosophy is palpable.61 
His theory is grounded in broadly similar cosmological and theological roots. Cicero posits an 
intelligent world soul that brought bodies into being – the providential divine mind (divina mens) 
that organises the universe and presides over its destiny. This divine mind is understood as 
instigating a cosmic order based on reason (ratio). This ‘unshakeable belief in the rational order 
of the universe and man’ is perhaps the most basic value of Cicero’s thought, ‘the intellectual 
underpinning of his other fundamental norms’.62 Cicero also assumes that there is a deep 
connection between cosmic order and political rule. ‘To that supreme god who rules the 
universe nothing (or at least nothing that happens on earth) is more welcome than those 
companies and communities of people linked together by justice that are called states.’63 And his 
understanding of the human psyche bears the stamp of Greek thought. ‘For our lusts are set 
over our thoughts like cruel mistresses, ordering and compelling us to do outlandish things.’64 
Although mathematics and geometry are absent, being unsuited to a Roman audience, much of 
the language used to express overarching political goals – ‘balance’, ‘harmony’, and the like – 
remains the same. Take this passage of purple prose from Cicero’s Republic:  
 
Just as with string instruments or pipes or in singers’ voices a certain harmony of different 
sounds must be maintained […] and as that harmony, though arising from the management 
of very different notes, produces a pleasing and agreeable sound, so a state, by adjusting the 
proportions between the highest, lowest, and intermediate classes, as if they were musical 
notes, achieves harmony. What, in the case of singing, musicians call harmony is, in the 
state, concord.65 
 
But what is interesting for our purposes about Cicero is not the way he domesticated Greek 
philosophy into late Republican Rome. I want to concentrate instead on two distinctive (and 
distinctively Roman) aspects of his thought. The first such aspect is the central role played by 
law in his political thought. His theory, centring on a powerful account of natural law, is much 
more obviously juridical than the Greek works that influenced him. The second aspect is the 
tension in Cicero’s work over the appropriate locus of justice. For Plato (and Aristotle), justice 
was a property of the city. The matter is for Cicero, as we shall see, rather less clear-cut. An 
empirically grounded and specifically Roman notion of constitutional justice pulls against a Stoic-
influenced notion of cosmopolitan justice. These two aspects will be examined in turn.  
For Plato, as we have seen, the connection between reason and law is less than umbilical. 
Law made a rather late arrival on the scene – the Laws was Plato’s last dialogue – and even then 
was understood more as the product rather than the instantiation of reason.  Justice, reason, and 
                                                     
61 Morrow, n 32 above, 20: ‘We might even plausibly argue that Plato’s Laws, through the Stoics and Cicero, was an 
important factor in the rise of [a] class of professional jurists in Rome.’ Indeed, as well as studying Greek thought in Rome, 
Cicero as a young man spent a number of years in Greece studying rhetoric and philosophy. See eg Cicero, On Duties (in 
M.T. Griffin and E.M. Atkins (eds), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), II.155: ‘I myself, whatever assistance I 
have given the republic, if I have given any, came to public life trained and equipped by my [philosophy] teachers and their 
teachings.’  
62 N. Wood, Cicero’s Social and Political Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 70.  
63 Plato, n 19 above, VI, 13.  
64 ibid, VI, 1. 
65 ibid, II, 69. 
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law are more closely related in Cicero. We are ‘born for justice’, Cicero says in the Laws,66 which 
means that we are born also to law. Law is ‘the highest reason, inherent in nature […] When that 
reason is fully formed and completed in the human mind, it, too, is law’.67 There are a number of 
points to be made about this conception. First, law is understood as the mark of the divine mind 
on all things. It is the essence of nature – God rules the universe by means of the law of nature. 
‘Law prescribes and prohibits in regard to the functioning of all things. Law is the edict of nature 
and as such the highest expression of the supreme rationality and authority.’68 Second, the law as 
understood by Cicero is not necessarily positive. He refers, for instance, to ‘that highest law 
which came into being countless centuries before any law was written down or any state was 
even founded’.69 Third, law inheres within the mind of the individual as much as the institutions 
and practice of the city. One implication of this is that an unjust law (or command) is not 
properly regarded as law at all. Fourth, law – law properly so called, natural law – is to be 
considered divine (or at least divinely inspired). ‘Since, then, there is nothing better than reason, 
and reason is present in both man and God, there is a primordial partnership in reason between 
man and God. But those who share reason also share right reason; and since that is law, we men 
must also be thought of as partners with the gods in law.’70 
But where does Cicero go with this and what does it have to do with proportionality? 
Cicero makes a subtle distinction between two forms of justice or fairness. The first form, which 
he calls aequitas, is the simpler form, denoting something like formal legal equality. The second 
form, called aequabilitas, Cicero reserves for a higher form of fairness – impartial, unvarying, 
consistent, evenly distributed.71 It refers to that ‘equality which gives to each according to his 
merits, his dignity and authority’.72 Natural law (or reason) dictates a higher form of justice which 
prescribes a particular constitutional structure and a certain distribution of goods (especially 
property). At its core lies the idea of proportionate equality, the (aristocratic) principle that more 
is owed to the superior, here defined principally in terms of birth and wealth, and less to the 
inferior. Each individual is duty-bound under the law of nature to render ‘to each his due’ in 
reference to life, property, promises, and benevolence. What is due to each depends upon the 
worth of each. The first duty of the republic becomes to safeguard the rights of private 
property,73 rights which acquire through the theory a ‘tincture of natural sanction’.74 Cicero even 
goes so far as to argue that cities grew up so that their citizens might have protection of their 
possessions.75 Cicero, defender of the inherited privileges of the senatorial class, thus deployed a 
natural law framework as a means of advancing ‘the oligarchic element in the Res Publica, in 
                                                     
66 ibid, I.28.  
67 ibid, I.18-19.  
68 Wood, n 62 above, 70-71.  
69 Plato, n 10 above, I, 19. 
70 Plato, n 10 above, I, 23.  
71 E. Fantham, ‘Aequabilitas in Cicero’s Political Theory, and the Greek Tradition of Proportional Justice’ (1973) 23 Classical 
Quarterly 285.  
72 C. Nicolet, ‘Cicéron, Platon et Le Vote Secret’ 19 Historia 39, 64 (my translation).  
73 See J.M. Carter, ‘Cicero: Politics and Philosophy’ in J.R.C. Martyn (ed), Cicero and Virgil: Studies in Honour of Harold Hunt 
(Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1972). 
74 Wood, n 62 above, 76.  
75 In Cicero, n 61 above.  
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which financial superiority was recognized as a claim to greater political rights, and justice was 
seen in the proportional representation of political power to wealth’.76 
But what, for Cicero, is the relevant locus or political context in which the framework of 
natural law, reason, and proportionate equality are meant to operate? The equivalent question in 
Plato’s case would be straightforward to answer.77 Justice properly so called is exercised between 
free and equal citizens of the same city – ‘by and large the scope of justice is defined by the 
boundaries of this particular polis.’78 Cicero’s position is less clear cut. On one hand, Cicero in the 
Republic makes a detailed, historically informed analysis of the Roman (Republican) constitution. 
He prefers the concrete and specific, he says, to the imaginary communities of Plato.79 And he is 
quite clear that states vary in terms of their moral excellence – he echoes, for instance, Plato’s 
prejudice against coastal cities as prone to corruption and decay.80 The Roman constitution is 
examined precisely because it is different from – and better than – the constitutions of other 
states. It might appear from this approach, then, that the relevant context for justice is the state. 
Elsewhere in the Republic, however, Cicero is adamant that natural law evades the boundaries of 
the state. As right reason, law is in harmony with nature. There is not one law for Rome and 
another for Athens; ‘all peoples at all times will be embraced by a single and eternal and 
unchangeable law.’81 This cosmopolitan dimension is even more apparent in the discussion of 
natural law in the Laws, where the Stoic influence is most pronounced. The whole universe, 
obeying the same celestial system, the divine mind, must be understood as ‘a single community 
shared by gods and men’.82 
 
And when the mind examines the heavens, the earth, the sea, and the nature of all things, 
and perceives where those things have come from and to where they will return […] and 
realizes that it itself is not a resident in some particular locality surrounded by man-made 
walls, but a citizen of the whole world as though it were a single city; then, in the majesty of these 
surroundings, in this contemplation and comprehension of nature, great God! how well it 
will know itself[.]83 
 
There is something glorious, no doubt, about this vision of global justice. But things are more 
complex than they first appear. What we are really witnessing here is an internal Roman 
disquisition on the ‘burden of empire’, almost certainly the first of its kind. Rome had expanded 
massively during Cicero’s lifetime, its imperium stretching outwards from its base on the Italian 
peninsula, Sicily, and nearer Spain to embrace more of north Africa, the near East, most of 
Spain, and Gaul. In a sense, then, the Republic sought to justify the ways of Rome to man. It 
aimed to show how ‘Roman conquest and Roman government are justified and sanctified by the 
                                                     
76 Fantham, n 71 above, 290. 
77 Although Socrates was quoted by Plutarch as saying, ‘I am not an Athenian or Greek, but a citizen of the whole world.’ 
Plutarch, Morals, Part VII, ‘Of Banishment, Or Flying One’s Country’, 5.  
78 A. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988), 146.  
79 Plato, n 19 above, II, 3.  
80 ibid, II, 7.  
81 Plato, n 19 above, III, 33. 
82 Plato, n 10 above, I, 23. 
83 ibid, I, 60 (my emphasis).  
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natural law of the universe’.84 Since, for Cicero, the Roman constitution most closely approaches 
the perfection of the mixed constitution (itself reflecting the harmonia and concordia of the 
cosmos), Rome is clearly deserving of eternal world rule. The ‘Dream of Scipio’, with which the 
Republic closes, describes the (entirely fictional) dream vision of the Roman general Scipio 
Aemilianus two years before he destroyed Carthage, Rome’s long-standing rival. In imagery 
redolent of the Timaeus, Cicero describes how the cosmos becomes the reward for the souls of 
statesmen (like Scipio’s grandfather by adoption, the conqueror of Hannibal, and natural father, 
conqueror of Macedonia) and those who ‘respect justice and do [their] duty’, honouring their 
ancestors and even more their country.85 
This reading of Cicero helps square the circle between the statist and globalist aspects of 
Cicero’s account of justice. On Cicero’s account the global and the local become one, in a certain 
sense. Not only does Rome become the epitome of good government, the state most clearly 
designed by the divine architect to represent divine order on earth. But also (and for the same 
reason) the rule of Rome over the whole world becomes a matter of divine sanction. In both 
these senses, then, ‘Rome is the cosmos.’86 Cicero may have been the first Roman thinker to 
think systematically about the imperial dimension of Roman law and politics. But this Ciceronian 
vision of a divinely sanctioned universal Roman order became a familiar political and rhetorical 
refrain by the early years of the Principate, as the limes of empire stretched still further. In this 
era, the force of the divina mens became bound up with the figure of the emperor. Pliny the Elder 
writes of Rome as being chosen by providence ‘to make heaven itself more glorious, to unite 
scattered empires […] to give mankind humanitas and in a word become throughout the world 
the single fatherland of all peoples’.87Vitrivius, in his classic book on architecture, hymns the 
built reality of Roman imperium, writing in the preface about the ‘divine mind and power’ of its 
dedicatee, Augustus Caesar, who has seized command of the world.88 
But, at least in its original Ciceronian formulation, the idea of Roman justice being divinely 
sanctioned had a sting in its tail. The surface gloss about Roman justice being the embodiment 
of the proportionate equality of natural (divine) law cannot hide the fact that even Roman rule is, 
in the end, all too human. Beneath the triumphal blaze, you can just detect a faint note of decay. 
Cicero’s own generation by no means escapes responsibility for presiding over a declining, if still 
expanding, order. We, Cicero charges his fellow citizens, ‘after inheriting our political 
organization like a magnificent picture now fading with age, not only neglected to restore its 
original colours but did not even bother to ensure that it retained its basic form and, as it were, 
                                                     
84 J.E.G. Zetzel, ‘Natural Law and Poetic Justice: A Carneadean Debate in Cicero and Virgil’ (1996) 91 Classical Philology 297, 
311.  
85 Plato, n 19 above, VI, 16.  
86 Zetzel, n 84 above, 310.  
87 Piny the Elder Natural History (in J. Healy (ed), London: Penguin, 2004), 3.5.39. 
88 De architectura, (in R. Schofield (ed), London: Penguin, 2007). See also the anonymous author known as Aetheticus writing 
in the late fourth or early fifth century: ‘[T]hat the Senate and People of Rome, masters of the whole world, conquerors and 
rulers of the globe, at the time when their triumphs reached everything that lies under heaven […] having subjugated the 
world by their prowess, marked everything with their own boundary, wherever the earth extends. And lest anything should 
escape their divine mind, which is master of all things, they traced out what they had conquered according to the four 
cardinal points of the sky, and by their celestial wisdom announced that everything that is surrounded by ocean consists of 
three parts, meaning Asia, Europe and Africa.’ I.K. McEwen, Vitruvius: Writing the Body of Architecture (Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press, 2004).   
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its faintest outlines.’89 And within a handful of years, the Republic constitution with whose 
protection Cicero’s career was bound, collapsed for good. The maelstrom leading to that final 
collapse took Cicero with it, the victim of what was in effect political murder, having been 
proscribed as an enemy of the State with the rise of the second triumvirate. 
 
 
 
PROPORTIONALITY, LAW, AND JUSTICE IN CLASSICAL THOUGHT 
 
Plato and Cicero present contrasting theories of law and politics. But, in both, proportionality 
lies at the heart of a dense set of relations, imbricated in a theory of distribution, a theory of 
justice, a theory of the city or state, a theory of social and political order, and ultimately a theory 
(or metaphysics) of cosmic harmony. More pertinently for our story, proportionality in both 
accounts is not just a central feature of a theory of justice, but is presented also as a matter of 
public law, a governing principle of legal and constitutional arrangements within the state.  
There are number of features of this classical conception that are worth highlighting. 
Interesting in their own right, they also have capacity to shed light on versions of proportionality 
that are now in currency. One feature is what we might call the ‘rounding off’ of proportionality. 
(The question here is ‘proportionate in relation to what?’) Proportionality in both Plato and 
Cicero is understood as a kind of a good in itself. There is something good – certainly something 
beautiful – in the very idea of things being properly aligned. But proportionality’s real value 
derives from the way it integrates and balances an order of values to which it is both somehow 
extrinsic and intrinsic. Proportionality, then, is (largely) a relational and aesthetic concept. Its 
importance (and virtue) stems ultimately from the way it glues together other values or orders of 
value. It is ‘rounded off’ in relation to those values. This rounding off process can be expressed 
in different ways. Plato often talks in terms of ‘right measure’, where the measure in question is a 
set of mathematical equations (or are expressible in such terms), mathematics and geometry 
being understood as both expressions of and ways of capturing the harmonious order of the 
cosmos. In Cicero, ‘proportionate equality’ relates to a scale of dignitas, which equates principally 
to currently existing material status, and especially property holding, and thereby to the 
solidification of the divinely modelled republic of laws.  
Proportionality stabilises and sanctions a normative frame. But, whatever they are, the 
elements that together make up that frame must themselves be good (or have the potential to be 
good) from the start. It is the combination of such elements in the right order that gives 
legitimacy to a constitutional order. Proportionality is what makes the elements combine 
virtuously – or else is the term that describes the condition in which they have so combined. 
Proportionality describes an arrangement that works on a number of interrelated levels, the 
proportionate arrangement of each level being connected to the proportionate arrangement of 
the others. Things are in proportion when things from top to bottom line up in the way that they 
should. When this does occur, we have found the Platonic equation of harmonious soul, 
harmonious city, and harmonious cosmos. The heavenly bodies are in alignment with themselves 
                                                     
89 Plato, n 19 above, V, 2. 
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and also with the ideal city. The inhabitants of the city are at one with themselves and also with 
the soul of each inhabitant. And the individual soul, situated in the good city and aping the 
movement of the stars, exists in balance with itself and the body.  
A second noteworthy feature of the classical conception relates to what we might call the 
‘reaching out’ of proportionality. (The question here is ‘proportionate in relation to whom?’) 
Both Plato and Cicero pay special attention to the particular environment in which their theory 
of proportionate justice plays out. Proportionality works more in the concrete than the abstract. 
It is a situated concept. It is about justice and law in a particular place, whether that place is 
Plato’s (near-)ideal city, arranged and ordered with a degree of specificity bordering on the 
obsessive-compulsive, or the Ciceronian vision of the Roman republic or ‘Roman cosmopolis’. 
The attention that each author gives to the jurisdiction in which proportionality plays out is by 
no means incidental. Plato is clear that significant deviation from the conditions that operate in 
Magnesia will mean that it is impossible for the city to become virtuous. Cicero writes about the 
Roman constitution precisely because it conforms most closely to the dictates of natural law. 
Other constitutions are deficient in the manner in which their arrangements correspond to the 
requirements of balance and proportionate equality. The strong claims for integration and unity 
that underlie the use of proportionality in both accounts drive the theorist to consider what the 
limits of the relevant community might be. This is clearest in Cicero’s writings, since it is clear 
that he struggled on this score. It is one thing to say (with Plato) that proportionate justice 
applies only to a strictly limited number of inhabitants of a particular polis. It is quite another to 
suggest, as Cicero was inclined to do, that the relevant class is humankind in general and that 
proportionality must have a global reach. In either case, to talk about proportionality 
presupposes talk about the jurisdiction in which it is meant to operate.  
 
 
 
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD 
 
Enough has been said already, I hope, to hint at an alternative history of proportionality. 
Proportionality has a lineage far older and more distinguished that the German principle of 
Verhältnismässigkeit. The classical sources discussed here provide support not only for the facile 
proposition that the proportionality principle has roots in older theories of justice. They also 
support the more serious claim for an older genealogy of proportionality as a matter of public law. 
No doubt a direct link can be found between ancient and modern. Given that the foundations of 
German law lie in the ius civile, the ‘original’ German principle was itself most likely influenced by 
classical sources generally and by Roman law more specifically.90 But, whatever the extent of 
such a link, uncovering the classical account of proportionality reveals a deeper stratum beneath 
the principle in its current manifestation. 
                                                     
90 E. Engle, ‘The History of the General Principle of Proportionality: An Overview’ (2011) Willamette Journal of International 
Law and Dispute Resolution (forthcoming) traces in the barest outline the development of proportionality from Aristotle 
through Cicero, Aquinas, and Grotius into both German law and the common law. Martin Loughlin traces the German 
origins of proportionality back to the notion of police – and Polizeiwissenschaft as a ‘science of right-ordering’ – and ultimately 
to the ‘disciplinary revolution’ that occurred during the course of the 17th and 18th centuries: see Foundations of Public Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), ch 14.  
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The classical model of proportionality, expressed with such clarity by Plato and Cicero in 
their respective variations, offers something of a mirror against which contemporary accounts 
can be set. One thing that has been touched upon already is what strikes the modern reader as 
the illiberal and inegalitarian role that proportionality plays in both Plato and Cicero. 
Proportionality for them was an avowedly aristocratic ideal. Perhaps this should make us pause 
before assuming too readily that the application of the proportionality principle today will 
invariably produce liberal outcomes. More substantially, we can see that our notion of 
proportionality, even in its stronger manifestations, is impoverished when set against classical 
versions. We will look first at metaphysics and the ‘rounding off’ aspect of proportionality, 
before turning to its ‘reaching out’ dimension.  
One element missing from our modern accounts of proportionality but fundamental to the 
classical version is the divine or cosmic. While some commentators go so far as to ascribe to the 
proportionality principle in the human rights domain a (secularised) religious foundation,91 few if 
any argue that proportionality has a cosmic significance or invoke divine sanction for a favoured 
construction of legitimate rule. In addition, modern accounts, for all their individualist 
presumptions, are devoid of any real consideration of what classical authors would have called 
the soul. One worries that in this silence the individual becomes either an empty cipher, ripe only 
for the exercise of consumer preferences, or else is constructed juridically by the declaration of 
rights that proclaims it.92 In the latter case, the individual (soul) is equated to what those rights 
documents say it is.  
This is not to say, however, that metaphysical ideas are entirely absent from modern 
conceptions. Contemporary theories of proportionality, springing from the wreckage of the 
Second World War, share with their classical forebears a concern to rebalance a world that had 
fallen so desperately out of kilter.93 In this aspiration for salvation we hear an echo of Plato’s 
recourse to proportionality in a time of turmoil and strife during which he saw his once great city 
suffer defeat and near destruction, and Cicero’s deployment of the same idea as his beloved 
Republic crumbled around him.  
The ‘rounding off’ element to proportionality noted in the classical account raises large 
questions about the application of proportionality in the modern world and the normative 
framework in which it is meant to operate. Answers to these questions will not be further 
developed here – other than to note in passing that the post-War development of a ‘post-
positivist neo-naturalist’94 legal ethics must form part of the story.  
But other points can be made. The first takes us back to where we started. We can now 
understand many proportionality sceptics’ concerns as being about its rounding off aspect. 
Sceptics often question the capacity of judges to apply proportionality in relation to anything 
other than rights.95 Rights at least provide some normative foundation and steer, they argue, 
whereas the application of proportionality in other contexts would mean that it would operate 
                                                     
91 See eg M. Perry, The Idea of Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).  
92 See eg C. Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2000). 
93 See eg M. Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).  
94 Engle, n 90 above, 1.  
95 See eg Taggart, n 7 above; J. Adler, ‘The Sublime and the Beautiful: Incommensurability and Human Rights’ (2006) Public 
Law 697. 
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without the guidance of such an established normative framework. And the classical model does 
indicate that proportionality means almost nothing in itself. I say almost nothing, since it seems 
that the need for symmetry, balance, and proportional relationships clearly lies deep within the 
human psyche.96 But in general when we talk about proportionality we refer to a relational 
concept, the virtue of which lies principally in how it glues together other elements and values. 
Something must be proportionate (or not) in relation to something else. The task of the 
decision-maker applying proportionality is to identify those elements and values and then to 
fashion them in a way that produces a harmony of the parts and therefore justice. Now, this task 
(or at least the first stage of it) might not be too difficult in practice. The values at stake might be 
obvious. But where they are not, there is a danger that either the judges either would be 
rudderless or the direction they steered would not have been agreed already by the polity at large. 
Both problems loom larger for us (perhaps) than for those who articulated the classical model. 
In part this is because democratic concerns are for us axiomatic in a way they were not for Plato 
or Cicero. Both rejected democracy as the fundamental political value within the shadow of 
which their theory of proportionality was to play out. It also may have something to do with the 
capacity of the ancients – some of them at least – to believe in the determinacy of reason to an 
extent that is quite breathtaking to the (post-)modern reader. (Although even then, unlike at least 
some of the moderns, Plato and Aristotle both thought that proportionality was too serious a 
matter to be contracted out to courts.)  
I said earlier that to talk about proportionality is to presuppose a jurisdiction in which it is 
to operate. Proportionality reaches out, demanding a defined political space in which the 
balancing is to take place. Currently, in British courts, argument abounds on this score in a way 
that directly echoes the old Ciceronian tension between locality and globality. Painting with a 
broad brush, we can identify two general positions: The first, identified in the Human Rights 
Act’s first decade with Lord Bingham, looks outwards, using various international and 
comparative sources to think through proportionality questions.97 The second, represented by 
Lord Hoffmann, ever more stridently so in his later years on the bench, talks the apparently 
sturdy language of the English common law, and looks inwards (and backwards) to source its 
legitimacy.98 The debate is particularly pronounced in the UK. Jurisdictional hybrid that the UK 
now is, British courts are in effect servants of two masters,99 with little choice but to strive to 
identify the source of normative authority – ‘European’ or ‘British’ – to which the various parts 
of the system ought to gravitate. But the tension exhibited in the English cases is also 
symptomatic of the proportionality debate more generally, at least as that principle plays out in 
the context of human rights, where it must negotiate a path through the oscillating poles of 
‘humanity’ and ‘nation’. 
                                                     
96 See eg R. Wittkower, ‘The Changing Concept of Proportion’ (1960) 89 Daedalus 199; B. Lepetit, ‘Architecture, géographie, 
histoire: usages de l’échelle’ (1993) 13 Genèses 118.  
97 See eg Sir T. Bingham, Widening Horizons: The Influence of International Law and Comparative Law on Domestic Law (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2010).  
98 See eg Lord Hoffmann, ‘The Universality of Rights’ (2009) 125 LQR 416. See further T. Poole, ‘Harnessing the Power of 
the Past? Lord Hoffmann and the Belmarsh Detainees Case’ (2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society 534. 
99 At least two masters. The situation is potentially even more complicated in the devolved regions, and especially Scotland.  
